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Abstract
Arnold and Sadler (2010) provides a ‘Pottsian’ analysis of supplemental
constructions, in particular appositive (non-restrictive) relative clauses,
in the framework of LFG and glue semantics. The account utilizes an
inference rule that splits single glue resources into their ‘at-issue’ and
supplemental sub-parts, and introduces other resources that re-integrate
the at-issue and supplemental content, so that the supplemental content
gets ‘widest’ scope, rather than (as in Potts’ account) being scopeless. No
proper justification is given for either of these aspects of the analysis. This
paper shows that while the splitting rule is unnecessary, apparatus for
re-integration is essential. The resulting treatment is both better justified
and formally cleaner.
1 Introduction
Arnold and Sadler (2010) (hence A&S) gives a ‘Pottsian’ analysis of ‘supple-
mentals’, specifically non-restrictive relative clauses such as the emphasised
part of (1), in the framework of LFGwith resource-sensitive (‘glue’) semantics
(e.g. Asudeh, 2004; Dalrymple, 2001; Andrews, 2011).
(1) Kim, who Sam dislikes, did not come to the party.
The analysis involves two innovations, neither properly justified, and both
potentially problematic:
i. an inference rule that ‘splits’ resources;
ii. apparatus for recombining at-issue and supplemental content.
The goal of this paper is to show that (i) is unnecessary (the splitting rule
is dispensable, and dispensing with it produces a better analysis), but (ii) is
necessary: without it the standard LFG approach to anaphora, as described
in (e.g. Asudeh, 2004; Dalrymple, 2001), makes empirically wrong predictions
about anaphora into and out of supplementals. The analysis we provide here
has the virtues of the analysis presented in A&S, but is better motivated, and
technically cleaner. More generally, (ii) relates to what has become one of the
main conceptual and empirical issues in discussions of Potts’ (2005) approach
to semantics, namely, the question of how ‘at-issue’ (normal) semantic content
should be related to what Potts calls ‘conventionally implicated’ (ci) content,
including supplemental content.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 gives a basic overview of the
relevant phenomena, Potts’ account, and the LFG implementation presented
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in A&S. Section 3 shows, based on straightforward and uncontroversial facts
about anaphora, that assumption (ii) is necessary, given the standard LFG
approach to anaphora. Section 4 discusses (i) – the need for an inference rule
that splits resources – and shows that it is not necessary, and that in fact one can
provide a basic account of the semantics of supplementals using only standard
glue apparatus (specifically, the same apparatus that is used for anaphora).
Unfortunately, a basic account is not quite a complete account. Recent work
has shown that the relationship between supplemental and at-issue content is
more subtle and varied than suggested in Potts (2005). Accordingly, Section 5
seeks to broaden the discussion of (ii) by considering some of the relevant
data.
2 Background
2.1 The Phenomena
Focusing on appositive (non-restrictive) relative clauses, such as (2), A&S
considers how the analysis of ‘supplemental’ expressions (e.g. appositives,
parentheticals, emotives, and honorifics) developed in Potts (2005) can be im-
plemented in the resource sensitive approach to the syntax-semantics interface
characteristic of LFG.
(2) Kim, who Sam dislikes, left early.
The fundamental distinction between appositive relative clauses (ARCs) and
superficially similar restrictive relative clauses (RRCs) is semantic, in that re-
strictive modifiers typically introduce an implicit ‘contrast set’, which can be
the antecedent of an expression like the others. Thus, (3a) with an RRC is
acceptable, but (3b) with an ARC is anomalous. There is also very often an
intonational difference (non-restrictives are often set off by ‘comma’ intona-
tion).
(3) a. Kim has three friends that I like (the others I don’t). [RRC]
b. Kim has three friends, who I like (#the others I don’t). [ARC]
Syntactically, the evidence for appositives being integrated into the syntactic
structure in the same ways as the restrictives seems to be overwhelming (e.g.
Jackendoff, 1977; Kempson, 2003; Arnold, 2007; Arnold and Sadler, 2010). But
there is an impressive body of evidence that they are not similarly integrated
semantically – for example, ARCs, instead of being interpreted where they
appear syntactically, seem to behave in some ways like independent clauses.
For example, in (4) the natural interpretation of (4a) involves Kim having a
belief about the set of linguists who are IPA users. By contrast, while the
natural interpretation of (4b) still involves Kim having a belief about the set
of linguists, neither the IPA nor its users need figure in Kim’s beliefs at all –
the proposition associated with the appositive relative clause (that linguists
use the IPA) is outside the scope of the propositional verb. In essence, (4b) is
interpreted as (4c),
(4) a. Kim believes that linguists who use the IPA are clever. [RRC]
b. Kim believes that linguists, who use the IPA, are clever. [ARC]
c. Kim believes that linguists are clever. They use the IPA.
Similarly, in the ARC in (5b), the proposition that linguists use the IPA is
not part of the question (i.e. if one assumes that questions involve a question
operator, then the content of theARChas escaped its scope). (4b) is interpreted
as something like (4c).
(5) a. Are linguists who use the IPA invariably clever people? [RRC]
b. Are linguists, who use the IPA, invariably clever people? [ARC]
c. Are linguists invariably clever people? (They use the IPA.)
The contrast in (6) shows that negative polarity items (NPIs) like any behave
differently in RRCs and ARCs. Plausibly this is because RRCs, and hence any
NPIs they contain, are in the scope of main clause negation. But an ARC, as
in (6b), is not in the scope of the main clause negation, so the NPI it contains
is unlicensed, just as it would be in an independent clause, as in (5c)
(6) a. But of course, we didn’t introduce the president to the three guests
that had any real opinions. [RRC]
b. *But of course, we didn’t introduce the president to the three guests,
who had any real opinions. [ARC]
c. *But of course, we didn’t introduce the president to the three guests.
They had any real opinions.
Given this data, ARCs are standardly analysed as being either ‘scopeless’ (as
in Potts (2005)), or having wide – more precisely, ‘widest’ – scope (see Arnold
(2007), and references there). The difference between these analyses is one of
the main themes of this paper.
2.2 Potts’ Approach
The fundamental idea of Potts’ account of these constructions (as well as other
supplements, emotives and honorifics) is that the interpretation of every ex-
pression involves (at least) twodimensions: (i) an at-issuedimensionof normal
truth-conditional content; and (ii) a ‘conventional implicature’ ci-dimension.
Themain technical apparatus he uses consists of syntactic and semantic parse-
trees with associated conventions (admissibility conditions), and an extended
type-theory. In addition to the normal (‘at-issue’) logical types (e, t, 〈e, t〉,
etc), he introduces a collection of ci-types, in particular, the type tc (the type
of ci-propositions), and a collection of at-issue to ci types, such as 〈e, tc〉 – the
type of functions from normal ‘at-issue’ entities to ci-propositions. Crucially,
however, there are no types 〈σc, τ〉 for any σ, τ – that is, there are no functions
from ci objects (e.g. ci propositions) to at-issue objects. The immediate conse-
quence of this is a radical separation of ci and at-issue content. In particular,
ci content cannot be the argument of any function, cannot be in the scope of
any operator, and is hence necessarily ‘scopeless’.
For Potts, the analysis of an example like (7) involves the syntactic parsetree
in (8), and the semantic parsetree in (9), reflecting respectively the syntactic
and semantic derivations (the syntactic parsetree is thus not necessarily a
representation of the surface syntactic structure – however, the distinction
will not be important here).
(7) Kim, who Sam dislikes, left.
(8) S
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(9) le f t( Kim ): t
❤❤❤❤❤❤❤❤❤
✭✭✭✭✭✭✭✭✭
Kim : e • dislike(Sam, Kim ) : tc
❤❤❤❤❤❤
✭✭✭✭✭✭
Kim: e comma(λy.dislike(Sam, y)) : 〈e, tc〉
le f t: 〈e, t〉
With respect to the syntactic parsetree, the only points of interest are (a)
the fact that the ARC is syntactically integrated, and (b) the presence of the
comma feature. This feature provides the interface between the phonological
and semantic properties: on the phonological side, it will trigger ‘comma
intonation’; on the semantic side it changes the type of the ARC from 〈e, t〉
(the type of a normal at-issue NP modifier) into 〈e, tc〉 – the type of a function
from entities to ci-propositions.
With respect to the semantic parsetree, the first point to notice is that the
content associated with the root node is le f t(Kim) : t, this is normal at-issue
content (type t), and just the content of (7) without the ARC. The second point
to note is the presence of two kinds of content on the node corresponding to
Kim, who Sam dislikes: the content of the ARC, and the content of the host NP
Kim. The two kinds of content are linked by the • symbol, with the ci-content
in a box (strictly speaking, every node should have both kinds of content, but
for every other node in the tree the ci-content is empty, so we have omitted
it). The third point to notice is that though the host NP Kim appears only
once in the syntax, the corresponding content is used twice, once in deriving
the at-issue content on the root node, and once in deriving the ci content (both
uses are highlighted).
The main technical point of interest is the semantics of comma, defined as in
(10).
(10) comma: λX.λx.X(x) : 〈〈σ, t〉 , 〈σ, tc〉〉 for σ ∈ {e, s, t}
In case it is applied to an expression of type 〈e, t〉, such as λy.dislike(Sam, y),
corresponding to who Sam dislikes, the result is an equivalent expression of
type 〈e, tc〉, cf. (11):
(11) a. comma(λy.dislike(Sam, y)) : 〈e, tc〉 =
b. λX.λx.X(x)(λy.dislike(Sam, y)) : 〈e, tc〉 =
c. λx.dislike(Sam, x) : 〈e, tc〉
Amore detailed view of the semantic derivation is given in (12), where every
node is labelled with both at-issue and ci content (the later normally empty),
the content of the ARC has been spelled out more precisely, and β-conversion
of λ-expressions has been carried out. The content of the node corresponding
to Kim, who Sam dislikes is produced by a node admissibility condition which
requires that where one daughter of a node has a type like 〈e, tc〉, the ci content
of the mother will be produced by applying the content of this daughter to
that of the other daughter, while the at-issue of content of the mother node
will be the content of the other daughter (hence the double consumption of
Kim, consumed once in the derivation of the ci content, once in the derivation
of the at-issue content).
(12)
le f t(Kim) : t
λx.le f t(x)(Kim) : t
•
❤❤❤❤❤❤❤❤❤❤❤
✭✭✭✭✭✭✭✭✭✭✭
Kim : e •
dislike(Sam,Kim) : 〈tc〉
λx.dislike(Sam, x)(Kim) : 〈tc〉
❤❤❤❤❤❤
✭✭✭✭✭✭
Kim : e •
Kim
λx.dislike(Sam, x) : 〈e, tc〉
λX.λx.X(x)(λy.dislike(Sam, y)) : 〈e, tc〉
comma(λy.dislike(Sam, y)) : 〈e, tc〉
•
❳
❳
❳
❳
✘
✘
✘
✘
who Sam dislikes
λx.le f t(x) : 〈e, t〉 •
left
The interpretation of a semantic parsetree is as follows. Let T be a semantic
parsetree with the at-issue term α : σ on its root node (a semantic expression
α of type σ), and distinct terms β1 : τ
c, . . . , βn : τ
c on its nodes, then the
interpretation of T is the tuple:
(13)
〈
[[α : σ]]M,g, [[β1 : τ
c]]M,g, . . . , [[βn : τ
c]]M,g
〉
In words, the interpretation of a semantic parsetree consisting of an at-issue
formula and a collection of ci formulae is found by interpreting all formulae
in the same model (M), with the same variable assignment function g. Thus,
for example, the interpretation of (12) will be as in (14):
(14)
〈
[[left(Kim) : t]]M,g, [[dislike(Sam,Kim) : tc]]M,g
〉
Notice that this means the model theoretic interpretation of Kim, who Sam
dislikes is essentially the same as that of (15) (recall the intuition about ARCs
and independent clauses above).
(15) Kim left. Sam dislikes Kim.
From a general theoretical point of view, the key point is that the approach
involves a radical separation of at-issue and ci content: (i) because there are no
expressions of type 〈τc, σa〉, ci content cannot be an argument of (in the scope
of) any semantic operator – ci content is scopeless; (ii) in fact ci and at-issue
content is never integrated, even ‘at the top’, and the only semantic relation
is that at-issue and ci content are interpreted in the same model(s).
From an LFG/glue perspective, however, there is an additional issue: the
challenge to ‘resource sensitivity’ posed by the double consumption of the
host of the ARC. Dealing with this is the main focus of A&S.
2.3 Resource-Sensitivity
From an LFG/glue perspective, a key problem with Potts’s approach is that
it involves a resource deficit: some semantic resources, specifically those as-
sociated with the host of an ARC, need to be consumed more than once.
Following a suggestion of Potts’, A&S proposes that ARCs and other sup-
plementals should be associated with resources like (16), where npe is the
resource associated with the host NP, and nptc is the resource associated with
the ARC.
(16) npe⊸ [npe ⊗ nptc]
Schematically, the semantics ofKim, who Samdislikes involves a glue derivation
along the lines of (17). Here the inputs are the normal contents of Kim, and
the (restrictive) relative clause who Sam dislikes. The vertical dots in (17)
abbreviate a number of things, notably the change in the glue type from that
of a restrictive relative to the type in (16), and a corresponding change in
the logical type of the left part of the glue expression. These details are not
relevant here.
(17) Kim
·
·
·
Kim : npe
who Sam dislikes
λQ.λX.dislike(Sam,X) ∧Q(X) : [v⊸ r]⊸ [v⊸ r]
·
·
·
λY.[Y, λX.dislikes(Sam,X)(Y)] : npe⊸ [npe ⊗ nptc]
[Kim, dislikes(Sam,Kim)] : npe ⊗ nptc
In the conclusion of this proof fragment we have, on the meaning side, a pair
of meanings corresponding to Kim and the proposition that Sam dislikes Kim;
on the glue side, a ‘tensor’ resource consisting of two resources, one in the
at-issue dimension, and one in the ci dimension.
A&S assumes we need to split these resources, so they can be used separately
(for example, in the derivation of the at-issue content of the whole sentence),
and so introduce a new inference rule: at-issue-ci-split (ACiS):
(18) [M,M′] : Re ⊗ Rtc
ACiS (at-issue-ci-split)
M : Re M
′ : Rtc
The effect of this can be seen in the proof in (19), where the righthand part
of the proof continues (17), first splitting the tensor resource, and combining
one of the objects produced (Kim : npe) with the resource associated with the
main verb, so that we end upwith two separate resources (a resource of type t
corresponding to Kim left and a tc resource corresponding to Sam dislikes Kim).
(19)
left
·
·
·
λY.le f t(Y) :
npe⊸ st
Kim
·
·
·
Kim : npe
who Sam dislikes
λQ.λX.dislike(Sam,X) ∧Q(X) : [v⊸ r]⊸ [v⊸ r]
·
·
·
λY.[Y, λX.dislikes(Sam,X)(Y)] : npe⊸ [npe ⊗ nptc]
[Kim, dislikes(Sam,Kim)] : npe ⊗ nptc
ACiS
Kim : npe dislikes(Sam,Kim) : nptc
le f t(Kim) : st dislikes(Sam,Kim) : nptc
A faithful implementation of Potts’ ideas could stop here. A reasonable ap-
proximation to Potts’ ideas would take the goal of a glue derivation to be a
single at-issue resource with zero or more ci resources:
{
st, f
0
tc . . . f
n
tc
}
where st is
associated with the root f-structure, each f i is of type tc. The final line of (19)
is just like this.
However, on the standard view, a successful LFG-glue derivation should
produce a single resource associated with the root S, and it is assumed in
A&S, without discussion, that this should be the goal of a ‘Pottsian-LFG’ glue
derivation.
A&S considers several approaches which produce the standard integration
into a single resource. The one we will assume here associates a resource
of the form (20) with each supplemental. This consumes the content of the
supplemental itself (↓σtc ) and produces a resourcewhich consumes the content
of the main clause (s) and produces a conjunction of the main clause and
supplemental content (this is again associated with the main clause – s).1
1Producing a definition of s is straightforward using inside-out functional uncertainty and
off-path constraints. The definition can be found in A&S Section 5; see example (84) and
surrounding discussion.
A&S also considers an alternative approach which associates an ‘of course’ ‘!’ meaning
constructor with the root S node, and an outside-in functional uncertainty to pick out supple-
mental content. The use of ‘of course’ resources – resources that can be used as often as desired
– is somewhat at odds with the spirit of resource sensitivity, so we avoid it here.
This [root-s] resource violates Potts’ requirement that there are no functions from the domain
of ci types – this is the price we pay for integrating ci and at-issue content. However, A&S also
mentions an alternative implementationwhich dispenseswith this function from the cidomain
(20) [root-s] λq.λp.(p ∧ q) : [↓σtc⊸ [s⊸ s]]
An example of the use of this resource can be seen in (21), where the other
inputs are the (unsplit) resource associated with Kim, who Sam dislikes, and the
resource associated with left.
(21)
λY.le f t(Y) :
npe⊸ st
[Kim, dislikes(Sam,Kim)] : npe ⊗ nptc
Kim : npe dislikes(Sam,Kim) : nptc
le f t(Kim) : st dislikes(Sam,Kim) : nptc λq.λp.(p ∧ q) :
nptc ⊸ [st⊸ st]
le f t(Kim) : st λp.(p ∧ dislikes(Sam,Kim)) : st⊸ st
le f t(Kim) ∧ dislikes(Sam,Kim) : st
To sum up: A&S proposes an implementation of Potts’ approach which in-
volves several pieces of apparatus. Two in particular are introduced essen-
tially without motivation. The first is an inference rule which splits a tensor
resource into two separate resources. In what follows we will see that this
rule is unnecessary. The second involves resources that allows at-issue and ci
content to be integrated. In what follows we will see that this is necessary if
we want to preserve the standard LFG-glue approach to pronouns.
We will begin with the second piece of apparatus, and show that integration
of at-issue and ci content is necessary, if we accept standard LFG assumptions.
3 Integration is Essential
The basic structure of the argument here is straightforward: (i) if supple-
mental content is not integrated, supplementals should be anaphoric islands,
given the standard LFG approach to anaphora; (ii) but supplementals are not
anaphoric islands.
The empirical point is easily established: (22) gives examples of in- and out-
bound anaphora with a supplemental (an ARC). In (22a) a main clause pro-
nounhas its antecedent inside theARC. In (22b) the pronoun is in theARCand
its antecedent is in the main clause. Such examples are completely normal.
(22) a. Pissarro, who Matissei met in 1898, encouraged himi greatly.
b. Matissei was greatly encouraged by Pissarro, who hei met in 1898.
So far as we are aware, this state of affair holds quite generally: there are no
caseswhere anaphora into and out of a supplemental ismore constrained than
anaphora into and out of the corresponding non-supplemental (e.g. restrictive
– one simply has to take the supplemental content to be a function that consumes the at-issue
meaning of the root sentence and produces another at-issuemeaning. While this is a technical
fix, it is at odds with Potts’ conception of there being two dimensions of content, associated
with different semantic types.
relatives).2 Supplementals are not anaphoric islands.3
We now turn to the theoretical point: the standard LFG approach to anaphora
resolution requires anaphor and antecedent to co-exist in a single semantic
structure. Demonstrating this requires a brief review of the standard LFG
approach (e.g. Asudeh, 2004; Dalrymple, 2001). Consider example (23).
(23) Kim thinks she won.
The standard approach assumes that the pronoun she consumes its antecedent
(Kim) and produces a resource like Kim × Kim : a ⊗ p, (a being the resource
corresponding to the antecedent and p the resource corresponding to the
pronoun itself), and uses hypothetical reasoning to produce a ‘context’ into
which pairwise substitution of antecedent and anaphor can occur, using a
special inference rule.4
In (24), to derive the semantics of (23), we hypothesise two resources [X : a]
and [Y : p], corresponding to the antecedent (main clause subject) and pro-
noun (embedded subject) respectively. With these we are able to produce a
(hypothetical) glue expression for the whole sentence — thinks(X,won(Y)) : s.
We also have the tensor resource formed by combining pronoun and an-
tecedent (Kim × Kim : a ⊗ p). The rule for tensor elimination ⊗ε, allows
simultaneous, pairwise substitution of the elements of the tensor resource in
place of the hypothesised resources to produce the let expression, which can
be β-reduced to give a semantics for the sentence as a whole.
2Notice we are not claiming there is no difference in the way anaphora works inside ARCs
vs restrictive relatives. Safir (1986) presented examples which purport to show the existence
of a WCO effect in restrictives like (b), which is absent from ARCs like (a):
a. John, whoi hisi wife loves ti, arrived early.
b. *A man whoi hisi wife loves ti arrived early.
But this is a difference in the internal grammar of ARCs and restrictives, not a difference in
the conditions on in- and out-bound anaphora. In any case, following Levine and Hukari
(2006), we are persuaded that the problem with (b) reflects a processing problem, rather
than something inherent to restrictive relatives. Restrictive relatives with the configuration of
pronouns in (b) can be acceptable, as in (c). What seems tomatter is how easy it is to determine
the reference of the pronoun apart from the reference of the crossing element (the relative
pronoun):
c Arthur is someone whoi not even hisi wife listens to ti.
3Just one example: VP Ellipsis behaves in the same way as pronominal anaphora. In (a)
ellipsis in a restrictive relative is anteceded by a VP inside the ARC. In (b) the situation is
reversed:
a. Sandy, who brought a bottlei, was rude to everyone who didn’t ∆i.
b. Everyone who brought a bottlei, was rude to Sandy, who didn’t ∆i.
We will not pursue this here, however, because this is only relevant if VP Ellipsis is ‘semantic’
in the sense of involving a relation between semantic objects. If the all that is involved is some
form of f-structure (near) identity between antecedent and ellipsis site, then these data would
just be evidence of syntactic integration.
4Intuitively, hypothetical reasoning allows one to avoid ordering problems in glue deriva-
tions. Without it, resources must always be produced before they are needed. With it, one
can at any point simply invent a hypothetical resource of the kind one needs. The proof will
succeed if (and only if) one can later find a real resource of the right kind to discharge the
hypothetical resource.
(24)
·
·
·
Kim × Kim : a ⊗ p
[X : a]1 [Y : p]2
·
·
·
thinks(X,won(Y)) : s
⊗ε,1,2
letKim × KimbeX × Y in thinks(X,won(Y)) : s
β ⇒
thinks(Kim,won(Kim)) : s
The point is quite straightforward: anaphora resolution requires pairwise
substitution into a context, which plainly requires there to be a context. But if
at-issue and ci content are not integrated, there will be no such context in cases
involving supplementals. In other words, if ci and at-issue content are not
integrated supplementals should be anaphoric islands, which they are not.
On the other hand, if at-issue and ci content are integrated, anaphora into and
out of supplementals can be handled straightforwardly. Consider the case of
in-bound anaphora in (25), parallel to (22a) (using John, Mary and her makes
the proof easier to follow by making the pronoun-antecedent relation more
obvious).
(25) John, who Maryi dislikes, admires heri
We begin by assuming two hypothetical resources: Z : a for the antecedent
(Mary), and Y : p for pronoun (her). With these we can produce resources
corresponding to the VP (the verb plus its object, ‘admire Y’), the subject (John),
and the ARC (‘Z dislikes John’ – the latter after we have used the splitting
rule in the analysis of the ARC). The VP resource can then consume the
subject resource so that we have a resource of type t associated with the
root sentence, and a resource of type tc. These can be integrated using the
[root-s] constructor.to produce a ‘context’ admire(John,Y)∧dislikes(Z, John) : st.
Independently, the pronominal resource associated with her can consume the
resource associated with its antecedent Mary, to produce the tensor resource
Mary×Mary : a⊗ p. Tensor elimination (⊗ε) and pairwise substitution do the
rest. See (26).
(26)
Mary ×Mary : a ⊗ p
[Y : p]1
·
·
·
λX.admire(X,Y) :
npe⊸ st
[Z : a]2
·
·
·
[John, dislikes(Z, John)] : npe ⊗ nptc
John : npe dislikes(Z, John) : nptc
admire(John,Y) : st dislikes(Z, John) : nptc λq.λp.(p ∧ q) :
nptc ⊸ [st⊸ st]
admire(John,Y) : st λp.(p ∧ dislikes(Z, John)) : st⊸ st
admire(John,Y) ∧ dislikes(Z, John) : st
⊗ε,1,2
letMary ×MarybeY × Z in admire(John,Y) ∧ dislikes(Z, John) : st
β ⇒
admire(John,Mary) ∧ dislikes(Mary, John) : st
Example (25) and the proof in (26) involve anaphora into a supplemental. The
case of anaphora out of a supplemental is equally straightforward.
(27) John, who shei dislikes, admires Maryi
The proof required for (27) is just the same as (26) except that the antecedent
(a) and pronoun (p) resources are switched (i.e. associate the variable Y with
the antecedent resource a, and put Z with the pronoun resource p, and leave
the rest of the proof exactly the same).
In short: if we want to do pronoun resolution using the standard LFG ap-
proach, then integration of ci and at-issue content is essential. Once we do
this, pronoun resolution is straightforward.
4 No Need for Resource Splitting
Having shown that integration is necessary, in this section we will show
that splitting is not necessary: it is not necessary to use an inference rule
to split ci and at-issue content, as assumed in A&S. In fact, it turns out that
if at-issue and ci content are integrated, we can dispense with splitting and
treat supplementals and their hosts in the same way as pronouns and their
antecedents, using hypothetical reasoning.
The change required to the apparatus assumed in A&S is almost trivial. The
idea is that for a host plus supplemental like Kim, who Sam dislikeswe produce
(28), instead of (29), which is what was proposed in A&S, and what we have
assumed so far. That is, we produce a resource whose meaning side is a
product expression A × B rather than a pair expression [A,B].5
(28) Kim × dislikes(Sam,Kim) : npe ⊗ nptc
(29) [Kim, dislikes(Sam,Kim)] : npe ⊗ nptc
Ignoringdetails, this gives a gluederivation like (30) forKim, who Samdislikes.
(30) Kim
·
·
·
Kim : npe
who Sam dislikes
λQ.λX.dislike(Sam,X) ∧Q(X) : [v⊸ r]⊸ [v⊸ r]
·
·
·
λY.Y × λX.dislikes(Sam,X)(Y) : npe⊸ [npe ⊗ nptc]
Kim × dislikes(Sam,Kim) : npe ⊗ nptc
The derivation for a full sentence (Kim, who Sam dislikes, left) involves hypo-
thetical reasoning. We begin by hypothesising two resources [Y : e]1 for the
host NP, and [R : tc]2 for the supplemental, andwe use the [root-s] constructor
associated with the supplemental to integrate ci and at-issue content. This al-
lows the derivation of le f t(Y) ∧ R : st; together with the tensor resource from
5This requires only a trivial reformulation of the [comma] meaning constructor. Where
A&S have (a), we would now have (b). We have highlighted the differences.
a. λP.λY. [ Y, (P(λZ.true))(Y) ] : [[v⊸ r]⊸ [v⊸ r]]⊸ [npe⊸ [npe ⊗ nptc ]]
b. λP.λY.Y × (P(λZ.true))(Y) : [[v⊸ r]⊸ [v⊸ r]]⊸ [npe⊸ [npe ⊗ nptc ]]
(30), this gives us the glue resources we need to eliminate the tensor, and
perform pairwise substitution for the host NP and the supplement. See (31).
(31) [Y : npe]1λX.le f t(X) :
npe⊸ st
le f t(Y)
[R : tc]2 λq.λp.(p ∧ q) :
nptc ⊸ [st⊸ st]
λp.(p ∧ R) : st⊸ st
le f t(Y) ∧ R : st
·
·
·
Kim × dislikes(Sam,Kim) :
npe ⊗ nptc
⊗ε,1,2
letKim × dislikes(Sam,Kim)be [Y,R] in le f t(Y) ∧ R : st
β ⇒
le f t(Kim) ∧ dislikes(Sam,Kim) : st
In short, we see that there is no need for the ‘at-issue-ci-split’ rule assumed in
A&S and given in (18) above. It can be eliminated by judicious use of standard
apparatus – specifically, hypothetical reasoning and pairwise substitution, as
used in the treatment of anaphora.
Formally, this is a useful result, because it means that glue derivations are
always ‘reducing’, in the sense that inference rules do not produce more
resources than they consume (cf. the A&S splitting rule takes one resource as
input, and outputs two resources), and this means that we can remain within
the standard tensor fragment of linear logic.6
Notice that nothing we have said in this section has any impact on the preced-
ing discussion of issues relating to the scope and integration of ci and at-issue
content. In particular, it is entirely consistent with ‘widest scope’ integration
of supplemental and at-issue, and with the treatment of anaphora discussed
above. More generally, the approach proposed in this section inherits all the
virtues of the approach described in A&S. It differs only in the formal details.
For the most part this is obvious and unsurprising. However, there is one
point where it is not obvious, and an interesting issue arises. The approach
described in this section involves supplementals pairing with their hosts, and
this might lead one to expect that they would have to be one-to-one with their
hosts. The approach described in A&S does not have this property: once
the resources associated with the supplemental and host have been split, the
host resource is available for use with other supplementals, so each host can
be associated with several supplementals. This might lead one to expect the
A&S account and the account described here to make different predictions
with respect to the possibility of ‘stacking’ supplementals.
In the following subsection we will show that this is wrong. There is no such
difference between the accounts: an analysis of stacked supplementals is a
straightforward consequence of the approach.
6As regards the formal apparatus, this approach establishes a strong link between the
antecedent-anaphor relationand thehost-supplemental relation–both involve tensor resources
and pair-wise substitution. The difference between them is that the host-supplemental relation
is far more constrained syntactically – the supplemental must be an adjunct of the host.
4.1 Stacking
Stacking of restrictive relatives is exemplified in (32):
(32) People who have liver problems who drink alcohol should take special
care.
It was at one time standard wisdom that ARCs do not stack in this way (e.g.
Jackendoff, 1977). This is untrue, as can be seen from attested examples like
(33).7
(33) What a tragedy it is that so many of our talented sixth formers, who
really would do well in your universities, who are dying to get there, who
queue, fight, struggle, work hard to get there, who have tremendous talents,
are denied access . . . [BNC KRG/1584]
(34) Kim, who Sam dislikes, who Les hates, left early.
Clearly, there is noproblemwith this sort of example if the resources associated
with host and supplement are split as on the original A&S proposal – after
the host resource has been used with one supplemental, the ‘splitting’ rule
will put it back in the resource pool, ready for re-use with another. Without
splitting, since we substitute host and supplement resources pair-wise, there
might seem to be a problem. However there is no problem in fact – we just
need to make proper use of hypothetical reasoning.
This is most easily demonstrated by showing a proof.
Consider (35), a slightly simpler version of (34).
(35) Kim, who Sam dislikes, who Les hates, left.
We begin with a hypothetical proof that introduces three hypothetical re-
sources, one ([W]1) corresponding to Kim, and one for each of the supplemen-
tals ([P]2, [Q]3); and uses two instances of the root-s constructor (again, one
per supplemental), to integrate main and supplemental content:
7Example (33) is from the British National Corpus. Arnold (2007) contains more examples.
The observation that ARCs can stack is not novel (e.g. Grosu and Landman, 1998; Grosu, 2000;
de Vries, 2002; Kempson, 2003; Arnold, 2007), but it is worth repeating because the alternative
view survived so long unchallenged. It is true that not all examples of stacked non-restrictives
seem equally good, which is why the myth of their unacceptability was relatively long lived,
and there seem to be discourse constraints of some kind. In particular, the examples are much
more acceptable if the supplementals in some sense ‘make the same point’, especially if the
later ones re-enforce the earlier ones. Thus, (34) is better with the focus on hates, as indicated
(the presumed point being Kim’s unpopularity).
(36) [W : k]1 λX.le f t(X) :
k⊸ s
le f t(W) : s
[P : r]2 λq.λp.(p ∧ q) :
r⊸ [s⊸ s]
λp.(p ∧ P) :
s⊸ s
le f t(W) ∧ P : s
[Q : r′]3 λq′.λp′.(p′ ∧ q′) :
r′⊸ [s⊸ s]
λp′.(p′ ∧Q) :
s⊸ s
le f t(W) ∧ P ∧Q : s
We can summarise this as:
(37) [W : k]1 λX.le f t(X) : k⊸ s [P : r]2 [Q : r′]3
·
·
·
le f t(W) ∧ P ∧Q : s
We now deal with the relative clauses themselves. Recall that we want to
produce tensor resources of the form np ⊗ r, where np is an ‘NP resource’
corresponding to the host, and r is the resource associated with the supple-
mental relative. It is straightforward to produce such a resource from one of
the ARCs (e.g. who Kim dislikes) and the NP Kim, as is show in abbreviated
form in (38).
(38)
Kim : npe
λQ.λX.dislikes(Sam,X) ∧Q(X) : [v⊸ r]⊸ [v⊸ r]
·
·
·
λY.Y × (λX.dislikes(Sam,X)(Y)) : k⊸ k ⊗ r
Kim × dislikes(Sam,Kim) : k ⊗ r
At this point there might seem to be a problem, because we have not done
anything with the other relative clause (who Sam hates), and we do not have
an ‘NP resource’ to combine it with. However, here we can avail ourselves of
the flexibility afforded by hypothetical reasoning. We hypothesise a resource
of the right kind, say [Z]1, and procede as in (39).
(39) [Z]1
·
·
·
Z : k
λQ.λX.hates(Les,X) ∧Q(X) : [v⊸ r]⊸ [v⊸ r]
·
·
·
λY.Y × (λX.dislikes(Les,X)(Y)) : k⊸ k ⊗ r′
Z × hates(Les,Z) : k ⊗ r′
Thus, by hypothesising [W : k]1, [P : r]2, [Q : r′]3, and [Z]4, we have produced
the following resources:
(40)
le f t(W) ∧ P ∧Q :
s
Kim × dislikes(Sam,Kim) :
k ⊗ r
Z × hates(Les,Z) :
k ⊗ r′
With these resources, the following proof is possible – it simply involves pair-
wise substitution of tensor resources into the ‘context’ of the main content
followed by β-reduction, as in (41). Here we first perform pair-wise substitu-
tion of the ‘hypothetical’ host plus supplemental Z × hates(Les,Z) : k ⊗ r′ and
then perform the same inference stepwith the non-hypothetical host plus sup-
plementalKim × dislikes(Sam,Kim) : k ⊗ r. Amoment’s reflection should show
that this approach can be extended to an arbitrary number of ‘hypothetical’
host plus supplemental resources, allowing an arbitrary number of stacked
supplementals to be handled.8
(41)
Kim × dislikes(Sam,Kim) : k ⊗ r
[Z : k]4
·
·
·
Z × hates(Les,Z) : k ⊗ r′
[W : k]1 [P : r]2 [Q : r′]3
·
·
·
le f t(W) ∧ P ∧Q : s
⊗ε,1,3
letZ × hates(Les,Z)beW ×Q in le f t(W) ∧ P ∧Q : s
⇒β
le f t(Z) ∧ P ∧ hates(Les,Z) : s
⊗ε,4,2
letKim × dislikes(Sam,Kim)beZ × P in le f t(Z) ∧ P ∧ hates(Les,Z) : s
⇒β
le f t(Kim) ∧ dislikes(Sam,Kim) ∧ hates(Les,Kim) : s
Once one appreciates the possibilities of using hypothetical reasoning there is
nothing very radical here. However, in a Pottsian context there is an impor-
tant theoretical point. As we have seen, dealing with stacked supplementals
requires use of hypothetical reasoning – in particular, the use of a hypotheti-
cal resources corresponding to the supplementals, but hypothetical reasoning
involves implication (⊸) introduction and elimination: if one has a resource
B, hypothesising a resource [A]1 yields a resource A⊸ B, corresponding to a
function from objects with the glue type A on the meaning side, and eliminat-
ing a hypothetical resource corresponds to function application on the mean-
ing side, as can be seen from (42) and (43), (cf. Asudeh, 2004; Dalrymple et al.,
1999). In the case of supplementals, the hypothesised meanings are of type
tc, objects in the ci domain, so the approach requires functions from the ci
domain, which Potts forbids. Without hypothetical reasoning – without these
types – one will only be able to deal with one supplemental per host, which
is empirically incorrect.
(42) [x : A]1
·
·
·
f : B
⊸x,1
λx. f : A⊸ B
(43) ··
·
a : A
·
·
·
f : A⊸ B
⊸ ε
f (a) : B
8Though we have not seen it discussed in the literature, exactly the same trick can be used
with pronouns. In an example with more than one pronoun dependent on one antecedent
(e.g. The boysi know theiri mother loves themi), the approach that is normally described involves
‘chaining’, so that (e.g.) their is the antecedent of them (or vice versa), but careful use of
hypothetical resources will also allow proofs where all pronouns are directly linked to a single
antecedent, paralleling the situation here, where several supplementals depend on a single
host. We are grateful to Ash Asudeh for insightful discussion on this issue.
5 Discussion
To sum up: on the purely technical level, we have shown that we do not need
a special inference rule to split ci and at-issue content. In fact, dispensing with
such a rule gives a formally neater treatment, since we are within the frame-
work of themodality-free, multiplicative fragment of intuitionistic linear logic
(MILL) that is assumed in, for example, Asudeh (2004), and it turns out that
we do not need any special semantic apparatus to deal with supplementals –
the only general apparatus required is that used independently in the analysis
of anaphora. The fact that no special apparatus is required is a positive result
for the Pottsian enterprise.
However, we have also seen that there are problems with the Potts’ approach
– in particular, problems for assumptions about the strict separation of ci and
at-issue content. We have seen that the standard LFG approach to anaphora
requires ci and at-issue content to be integrated, and we have seen that the
treatment of stacked supplementals requires the existence of functions from
the ci domain, which are forbidden under Potts approach.
While these conclusion are clear enough in themselves, their implications are
less obvious because the issue of integration of ci and at-issue is more puzzling
and complicated than we have suggested so far. In this final section we will
broaden the discussion by considering some of these complications.
The discussion so far has assumed implicitly that there are only two po-
sitions worth considering: the Pottsian position, where supplementals are
completely un-integrated, hence ‘scopeless’, and the position taken in much
of the standard literature that they are integrated at the highest level – that
they have ‘widest’ scope. In particular, while the evidence discussed at the
start of Section 2 is consistent with both these positions, there is a growing
body of research which shows this to be a great over simplification, for there
appear to be cases where supplementals must be analysed as being seman-
tically integrated, and having intermediate scope (e.g. Sells, 1985; Roberts,
2006; Amaral et al., 2007; Nouwen, 2006; Harris and Potts, 2010; Wang et al.,
2005; Schlenker, 2010; AnderBois et al., 2010).
Sells (1985) drew attention to examples like (44), where the relative clause
contains a relative pronoun and a definite noun phrase (the box) associated
with a NP (a spare pawn) in the scope of a universal quantifier. Intuitively,
this would appear to be a supplemental in the scope of a universal (cf. also
Kempson, 2003).
(44) Every chess set comes with a spare pawn, which you will find taped to
the top of the box.
Similarly, Roberts (2006) discusses examples like (45), where the interpretation
of the subject of the relative clause depends on that of his wife, which is in the
scope of the universal every professional man:
(45) Every professional man I polled said that while his wife, who had earned
a bachelor’s degree, nevertheless had no work experience, he thought she
could use it to get a good job if she needed one.
Arnold (2007) notes examples like (46), where there seems to be a kind of
scope paradox: the pronoun her is semantically dependent on the negatively
quantified NP no properly trained linguist, so one might think that it, and pre-
sumably thewhole supplemental, is in the scope of the negativeNP.However,
this cannot be the case, because if were so, then the negative polarity item ever
should be licensed, which it is not.
(46) No properly qualified linguist, who would (*ever) have been taught
phonetics as part of her training, would have made that mistake.
Examples like this indicate that the issue of scope of supplementals is complex.
However, they are not necessarily indicative of supplementals taking narrow
scope. Sells noted that the cases where this is possible are cases where the
supplemental content can be conveyedwith a separate clause, compare (47):
(47) Every chess set comes with a spare pawn. You will find it taped to the
top of the box.
So it is possible that whatever mechanism is responsible for extending the
scope of the universal in such cases is also operative in supplementals like
(44) (Arnold (2007, 2004) develops this approach to account for examples like
(46)). If this is correct, then these are not really examples of intermediate
scope, but rather examples of widest scope/scopelessness subject to some
other mechanism.
However, Schlenker (2010) discusses examples like (48) from French, which
shows a subjunctive in a supplemental relative clause. Crucially, the sup-
plemental here is interpreted as being in the semantic scope of eˆtre con-
cevable (roughly the sense ‘it is conceivable that John may have called his
mother/Anne, who may conceivably have called her lawyer’).
(48) Il
It
est
is
concevable
conceivable
que
that
Jean
Jean
ait
has-sub
appele´
called
sa
his
me`re/Anne,
mother/Anne,
qui
who
ait
had-sub
appele´
called
son
her
avocat.
lawyer.
Harris and Potts (2010) provide an empirical study incorporating corpus and
experimental data that make it clear that cases of narrow scope do exist. It
is clear from the context of (49) that the supplemental which was installed last
week is in the scope of (Joan) believes.
(49) Joan is crazy. She’s hallucinating that some geniuses in Silicon Valley
have invented a new brain chip that’s been installed in her left temporal
lobe and permits her to speak any of a number of languages she’s never
studied. Joan believes that her chip, which was installed last month, has a
twelve year guarantee. (emphasis in original) (Harris and Potts, 2010).
There are also clear cases where other kinds of supplemental take narrow
scope. Wang et al. (2005) gives examples like the following, where nominal
appositive supplementals are in the scope of, respectively, want, believe, and
might.
(50) Mary wants to marry an Italian, a rich one.
(51) John believes that a professor, a quite famous one, published a new book.
(52) A wolf, a ferocious animal, might come into your house.
However, Wang et al. (2005) note that it is much harder to give supplemental
relatives (i.e. ARCs) narrow scope in this way, so for example while (50) has
a de dicto interpretation with an Italian under the scope of want, (53) has only
a de re interpretation, where Mary wants to marry a specific Italian. It is
not obvious why this should be the case (but see Nouwen, 2006, for some
discussion).
(53) Mary wants to marry an Italian, who is rich/who is a rich one.
Some of these examples involve quite subtle judgements or unusual situa-
tions, but it is worth emphasising that this is not always the case. Though it
appears not to have been commented on in the literature, cases where sup-
plementals appear to be integrated below the level of widest scope are rather
commonplace. Consider (54).
(54) In this portait, theKing,who is dressed in armour and holding a commander’s
baton, is wearing a the medallion of a Garter Sovereign.
Here it is clear that the supplemental content is to be interpreted with respect
to the embedded situation of the picture, not the (widest) scope context. Of
course, it is not completely obvious that there is an issue of scope here – one
would need to provide a proper semantics to show this, but notice that it is
quite possible for the host of the supplemental to be quantified, as in (55).
(55) In this picture, two knights, who are evidently drunk, are chasing two
dragons, while several other knights look on.
Similar examples can be constructed with, e.g. in my dream, in this novel, in
this possible world, and with the corresponding verbs (e.g. dream):
(56) Sam dreamed that she kissed George Bush, who was wearing a strange
uniform.
(57) Sam dreamed that she kissed two strangers, who were wearing strange
uniforms.
What is one to make of this? These data are clearly challenges for both
‘scopeless’ and ‘widest scope’ accounts, and while it is not at all clear to us
what the right approach is, we can point to what we think would be a wrong
approach.
In Section 2.3 we presented a meaning constructor that could be associated
with each supplemental, and would integrate the supplemental content with
that of the main clause. If the glue term s is associated with the f-structure of
the root clause, this will give the supplemental content ‘widest’ scope (cf (20),
repeated here):
(58) [root-s] λq.λp.(p ∧ q) : [↓σtc⊸ [s⊸ s]]
The way to ensure that s picks out the root clause is to use an inside-out func-
tional uncertainty, and an off-path constraint, which says that the relevant
f-structure must not be the value of any attribute. It would be easy to replace
this off-path constraint with another, e.g. one which says that the relevant
f-structure must contain some value for tense. This would allow the supple-
mental to scope at the level of any f-structure containing a tense value (any
clause, for example).
It seems to us that this is clearly thewrong approach to take. There are two key
points. The first is that wide scope or something similar (e.g. scopelessness)
represents something like the default case. The second is that deviation from
this default case is something to do with maintaining some kind of discourse
coherence. The reason we get narrow scope in (49) is that giving the supple-
mental wide scope would involve attributing to the speaker the same kind of
delusional beliefs as Joan – beliefs that the speaker herself is characterising as
delusional. Similarly, we interpret examples like (54)–(57) as we do because
they ‘make more sense that way’ (e.g. in the case of (54), there is no king in
the context outside the picture to support a wide scope reading). Whatever
processes are involved here seem to be clearly pragmatic in nature, and not
something that should be dealt with at the syntax-semantics interface which
is the domain of glue logic.
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